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WILK t'. VENCn..t.

[30 C.2d

[L. A. No. 19745. In Bank. May 13, 1947.]

NAT WILK, Appellant, v. CHARLES A. VENCILL et al,
Respondents.
[1] Frauds, Statute of-Estoppel to Aas8rt.-A wife who refused
to carry out a promise to sign a contract to sell residential
property owned by her and her husband in joint tenancy is
estopped to invoke the statute of frauds where the prospec_
tive purchaser, in reliance on her representations that she
consented to the sale and would sign the contract and also on
her acts in encouraging his preparations to move into the
house with his family, relinquished an opportunity to buy another home in that neighborhood.
[2] Speci1lc Performance - Pleading - Complaint.-ln an action
for specific performance of a eontract to sell residential property owned in joint tenancy by husband and wife, a complaint alleging her refusal to carry out a promise to sign the
contract and facts which would estop bel' from relyin~ on
the statute of frauds. including plaintiff's loss of an opportunity to purchase another bome in reliance on such promise,
was not insufficient because of the failure to aUege that the
wife knew of such opportunity.
[3) Frauds. Statute of - Estoppel to Assert. - The doctrine of
estoppel is not destructive of the statute of frauds. Without
the qualifying doctrine of estoppel in a proper case, the
statute would encourage rather than prevent the perpetration of frauds.
[4a, 4b] Speci1lc Performance - Pleading - Demurrer.-ln an aation for specific performance of a contract to sell realty owned
in joint tenancy by busband and wife, it was error to sustain
the husband's demurrer to the complaint without leave to
amend, assuming that the complaint was insufficient as to the
wife because she refused to sign the contract, where the contract did not show on its face that botb joint tenants were to
sign.
[6] CotenanC)'-Joint Tenancl-Conveyancea. - One joint tenant
may dispose of his interest in real property without the Mnsent of the other.
(ll See 12 CaLJur. 935; 49 Am.Jur. 888.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Frauds, Statute of, § 59(4); [2]
Specific Performance, § 101; [3] Frauds, Statute of, § 59(1); [4]
Specifio Performance, ~ 124; [5] Cotenancy, § 7; [6] Specific Performance, § 16; [7] Specifio Performance, § 29(1); [8] Pleadilll.
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Performance-Availability of Remedy.-A party may
to convey more than he possesses and, although he can
fully perform, specifIc performance may be available in
far as it is possible.
- Oontract - Oertainty. - A contract to sell residential
owned in joint tenancy by husband and wife was
~lclEjntlLy clear in it!l statement of terms to support a decree
performancf where it recited that a designated
of the purchase price was to be deposited in escrow
a certain tim" after a property settlement agreement
executed between the seller and his wife, that the propwas to be subject to encumbrances for the unpaid baland that the wife would surrender possession of the
......,......1'1tv when she was able to procure other living accommoA

.~I&d:1nlr - Demurrer to Oomplaint - Amendment
8Usta,1nE~d.--Where a complaint is sufficient

After Deas against
".'PBnlmLi demurrer, it is improper to sustain special demurrers
,'='.,.-.~ .. leave to amend .
• "" ."...,.u

from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

County. Alfred E. Paone&'Ia.•Judge. Reversed.

for specific performance or damages. Judgment of
after sustaining demurrers to complaint without
amend. reversed.

G. Bergman for Appellant.
H. Robinson and Harold M. Heimbaugh for BeJ.-This appeal is from a judgment of the
court dismissing an action for specific performance
after defendants' demurrers to plaintiff's fourth
l~"" ...ul1J'Q"'U had been sustained without leave to amend.
are alleged in the fourth amended
hu.qband and wife, are the owners
ten311~~y of a house and lot. On July 24, 1945, plainUeJ:t:n4118IU. hUl~band executed the following agreement:
of Nat Wilko the sum of Ten Dollars as part
for my real property located at 425 North Martel
Angeles, California.
, entire price to be paid for the above described prop~he sum of Eighty-Nine Hundred Dollars and to be
, follows:
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"Five Thousand Dollars Cash in escrow to be commenced
within thirty days after a property settlement agreement ill
executed between the undersigned seller herein and his wife.
"Also this property to be sold to said Nat Wilk subject to
two encumbrances wherein their total unpaid balance.q ill the
sum of approximately Thirty-Nine Hundred Dollars.
"Further this within option to purchase the above described
property is made with the specifie understanding that the
undersign's wife will surrender possession thereof when and
if she is able to procure other living accommodations.
Dated July 24, 1945.
Chas. A. Vencill
"I accept the within option.
"July 24, 1945.
Nat Wilk"
Plaintiff gave defendant wife a copy of this agreement and
requested that she join in its execution. She stated that she
approved of and consented to the sale and agreed to sign
the agreement as well as any other documents necessary to
tbe transfer of title. Mrs. Vencill informed plaintiff of mario
tat difficulties between her and her husband and said that
they were living apart and were negotiating a property set·
tlement She stated that she wished to defer executi~n of the
agreement until she and her husband completed their property
settlement agreement. She estimated that this would be
accomplished in about a week from .July 24. 1945, and that
immediately thereafter she would sign the agreement to sell
the property.
Plaintiff was negotiating to purchase another home for
himself and his family in the neighborhood where defendants
live. The price was approximately the same a.q that fixed
by defendants for their house. and the two houses were much
alike. Plaintiff decided to purchase defendants' house and
the other house was subsequently sold to another. When defendants later refused to sell there was no other house available in that neighborhood. Within a day or two after Mr.
Vencill signed the agreement to which Mrs. Vencill orally
assented, plaintiff made arrangements, in her presence. with
painters and contractors to make repairs and improvements
to the property. Mrs. Vencill told plaintiff that she wa.q
happy that he and his family were going to live in the house
and that she preferred them to any other prospective purchasers. She stated that she was sure that they would be
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happy in the home after it was redecorated and repaired.
'('he next day she agreed to sell the bedroom rugs to plaintiff,
a price to be fixed when she moved out. Plaintiff spent
two weeks after July 24, 1945, cutting, cleaning and
.':·....·tel'1in2 the grounds and premises, devoting his time thereto
of his law practice. He also expended $10
another person to assist him.
lJe:ren.aa:nts executed their property settlement agreement
'or about .July 31. 1945. and at' that time, or immediately
..
, plaintiff asked 'Mrs. Vencill to carry out her agreeMrs. Vencill refused. stating that she was arranging
the property to others, having been advised that plainnot enforce the performance of her promise.
Plaintiiff contends that when Mrs. Vencill made her promdid 80 with the secret reservation not to perform and
the intention of misleading and deceiving him. Plaintiff
iII!IIlClerEKl the $5.000 within the prescribed time and the tender
refused. Be states that the price of $8.900 is fair and
fair at the time of the execution of the agreement. The
eteJrl(:Iants agreed to sell the proprty to another on or about
15. 1945. for about $9.000. but this sale has not yet
. eonsummated. Plaintiff reC'luests specific performance or,
is not possible. damages. Both defendants separately
1Mi1111'1"li'P.d generally and specially and their demurrers were
ISt8.mE~ without leave to amend.
Plaintiff contends that although Mrs. Vencill did not
contract 8."1 required by the statute of frauds (Code
§ 1973: Civ. Code, § 1624). her conduct was
. to bar her from invoking the statute. Defendants
that plaintiff can show only that he relied upon her
to sign the sales contract and that the failure to
with a promise cannot serve as a basis for estoppel.
contention was advanced in Seymour v. Oelrichs,
.. 792, 797 [l06 P. 88. 134 Am.St.Rep. 154], upon
del:enclan1t8 rely. It was there stated that although the
to make a writing as agreed is not such fraud as will
Ii ease from the operation of the statute of frauds .
.the doctrine of equitable estoppel u a representation
:.:Jmt1Ill-~ ~tention, absolute in .form, deliberately made for
DmI"Ml!lP. of induencing the conduct of the other party
upon by the other party, 1... generally the source
and may amount to a contract enforceable as such
'11'-.•;-........ of equity." (Pp. 797-798.)
Plaintiff alleged that

)
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lirs. Vencill told him that she consented to the sale and that
she would sign the agreement in the near future; that in reliance upon her representations and acts he relinquished his
opportunity to buy another home in that neighborhood within
his price range; and that her words and acts led him to rely
upon the security of his agreement. He thereby lost more
than the subject of the agreement; he lost the opportunity
to purchase another home. [2] Plaintiff does not allege that
Mrs. Vencill knew of his opportunity to buy another home.
but he states that he can prove. that she did and that he requested the trial court to allow him to amend his complaint
in order to add this allegation. The failure to make the allegation, however, is not fatal to his statement of a canse of
action. The objeet of Mrs. Vencill's representations was to
lead plaintiff to consider himself entitled to buy her house
and to regard his search for a family home as ended. She
encouraged his preparations to move into her house with his
family. Since his change of position was a natural and
probable consequence of his reliance upon her representations. it is immaterial whether or not she actually knew of hi~
opportunity to purchase another home in that neighborhood
[3] The doctrine of estoppel is not destructive of th('
statute of frauds. (Halsey v. Robinson, 19 Cal.2d 476. 48:!
[122 P.2d 11].) Without the qualifying doctrine of estoppel
in a proper case the statute would encourage rather than prevent the perpetration of frauds. (Wilson v. Bailey, 8 CaL2d
416, 422 [65 P.2d 770].) [4] Plaintiff must still establi"h
the truth of his allegations. and if he does not prove the con·
tract, the reliance. and the change of position by a prepon·
derance of the evidence. he cannot recover. (See Notten v.
Mensing, 3 Cal.2d 469. 477 [45 P.2d 198]; Notten v. Mensing, 20 Cal.App.2d 694. 697 [67 P.2d 734].)
Mr. Vencill contends that if his wife is successful in her
defense on the statute of frauds. he cannot be held to the
contract on the ground that where one of two joint tenants
contracts to sell real estate and the other joint tenant doe'!
not execute the contract, the party executing the agreement
cannot be compelled to convey his own undivided interest
since he contracted to sell the entire property and not simply
his undivided interest therein. Assuming that plaintiff cannot sustain his burden of proof as against Mrs. Vencill, it
does not follow that plaintiff's complaint against her husband
must be dismissed. [5] One joint tenant may dispose of
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. interest without the cOllilent of the other. (Delanoy v.
216 Cal. 23, 26 [13 P.2d 513].) [6] Further, a
may agree to convey more than he possesses and, alhe cannot fully perfonn, specific perfonnance may be
~·.:rI_"'A in so far as it is possible. (Armstrong v. Sacramento
.B. 00.,52 Cal.App. 110. 116 [198 P. 217]; see 5 Williston
. Contracts, § 1436; Rest., Contracts, § 365.) [4b] The
does not show on its face that both joint tenants were
Mr. Vencill, in view of his impending separation,
intended to convey his interest whatever the decihis wife. The nature and extent of plaintiff's recov. any, against Mr. Vencill will be decided after the
been presented to the trial court. It was thereto sustain Mr. Vencill's demurrer. regardless of
~,,,.I-UAl't5 with respect to his wife.
are other objections raised by defendants, establishmost only plaintiff's inability to obtain specific per['1] The contract is sufflciently clear in its stateto support a decree of specific performance
::.uotI.MU v. ltuffer, 68 CaI.App.2d 376, 383 [156 P.2d
. and the trial court may require additional clafifications
'pleadings if necessary, or deny specific performance
remedy is not proper. [8] The complaint is sufticient
a general demurrer, however. and in such a case it is
to sustain special demurrers without leave to amend.
P'rR01Ia Pictures Oorp. 11. De Toth, 26 Ca1.2d 753, 762
217, 162 A.L.R. 747]; Wilkerson v. 8610, 20 Cal.
[127 P.2d 904].)
U.Ut{UlI".... is reversed.

~"lJ'.uJ'~,

C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
tJpenee. l., oou.cmrecl.

